Population and Ethnic Groups

<h1>Population and Ethnic Groups</h1> <p>Singapore's total population was 6.11 million as at June 2025, made up of 3.66 million citizens, 0.54 million permanent residents, and 1.91 million non-residents (<a href="https://www.population.gov.sg/files/media-centre/publications/Population_in_Brief_2025.pdf">Population in Brief 2025, accessed Aug 2026</a>). That three-way split is the single most important fact about Singaporean demography: nearly a third of the people in the country are neither citizens nor PRs but foreign workers, domestic workers, students, and dependants whose presence is regulated by pass policy rather than by immigration in the settlement sense (see <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.daily-life.work-passes">work passes</a>). Alongside this sits a second structural fact — a collapsed birth rate and rapid ageing among citizens — which together make immigration policy the central and most politically sensitive lever in Singaporean demography. Current headline figures are tracked in <a href="/en/knowledge/dataset/sgkb.data.key-statistics">key statistics</a>.</p> <h2>Residents, non-residents, and how they are counted</h2> <p>Singapore's statistics distinguish carefully between three groups, and conflating them produces most of the confusion in public discussion. <strong>Citizens</strong> hold Singaporean nationality. <strong>Permanent residents</strong> hold long-term residence status with rights to live and work indefinitely but not to vote, and male PRs and their sons are liable for <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.defense-national-service.national-service-system">National Service</a>. Together citizens and PRs form the <strong>resident population</strong>, the base for most social statistics on income, housing, and education. <strong>Non-residents</strong> are everyone else present on a pass: work pass holders across all tiers, migrant domestic workers, students, and dependants. As at June 2025 the non-resident population grew 2.7% year on year to 1.91 million while the citizen population grew 0.7% and the PR population stayed essentially flat — the PR intake has been deliberately held near a stable annual quota for years (<a href="https://www.population.gov.sg/files/media-centre/publications/Population_in_Brief_2025.pdf">Population in Brief 2025, accessed Aug 2026</a>). Roughly two-thirds of non-residents are the foreign workforce proper, with the remaining third mainly domestic workers, dependants, and students.</p> <h2>The CMIO framework</h2> <p>Singapore officially classifies its population into four racial categories — <strong>Chinese, Malay, Indian, and Others</strong> — known by the acronym CMIO. The classification is recorded on identity documents, and it drives real policy: ethnic quotas in <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.housing.hdb-system-overview">HDB blocks</a> under the Ethnic Integration Policy, minority representation requirements in <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.government-politics.elections-and-grc-system">GRCs</a>, mother-tongue assignment in schools (see <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.demographics-society.languages-and-bilingual-policy">languages and bilingual policy</a>), and self-help groups organised by community. Among citizens in 2025, the composition was 75.5% Chinese, 15.1% Malay, 7.6% Indian, and 1.8% Eurasian and others (<a href="https://www.population.gov.sg/files/media-centre/publications/Population_in_Brief_2025.pdf">Population in Brief 2025, accessed Aug 2026</a>); proportions for the wider resident population differ slightly because of the PR mix. CMIO is defended as the mechanism that guarantees minorities institutional presence and prevents majoritarian drift in a society with a clear ethnic majority. It is criticised for flattening enormous internal diversity — &quot;Indian&quot; spans Tamil, Malayalam, Punjabi, and many other communities; &quot;Others&quot; bundles Eurasians with everyone unclassifiable — and for entrenching race as an administrative category, though the option to register a double-barrelled race has softened this since 2010.</p> <h2>Fertility collapse and ageing</h2> <p>Singapore has one of the world's lowest fertility rates and it is still falling. The resident total fertility rate dropped below 1.0 for the first time in 2023 at 0.97, stayed there in 2024, and fell further to a record low of about 0.87 in 2025 — far under the 2.1 replacement level, and low even against East Asian peers. Ageing is correspondingly rapid: those aged 65 and above make up roughly 19% of the population as of 2025, and the number of citizens aged 80 and above rose about 60%, from 91,000 in 2015 to 145,000 in 2025 (<a href="https://www.population.gov.sg/files/media-centre/publications/Population_in_Brief_2025.pdf">Population in Brief 2025, accessed Aug 2026</a>). The causes are the familiar high-income cluster — late marriage, cost of housing and childrearing, long working hours, and women's education and career participation — and successive pro-natalist packages of baby bonuses, tax reliefs, parental leave, and housing priority have not moved the trend. The consequences drive policy across the knowledge base: healthcare and long-term care financing (see <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.healthcare.healthcare-financing">healthcare financing</a>), retirement adequacy (see <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.cpf-social-security.cpf-life">cpf life</a>), a shrinking working-age base, and the resulting reliance on immigration.</p> <h2>Immigration as the balancing lever</h2> <p>The National Population and Talent Division describes immigration as moderating the effects of ageing and low birth rates, while maintaining a measured pace and carefully controlled grants of PR and citizenship; in 2024, 35,264 people were granted PR and 22,766 were granted citizenship (<a href="https://www.population.gov.sg/files/media-centre/publications/Population_in_Brief_2025.pdf">Population in Brief 2025, accessed Aug 2026</a>).</p> <p>Because natural increase cannot sustain the workforce, Singapore maintains population size and economic capacity through controlled immigration: a steady annual intake of new citizens and PRs, plus a much larger, explicitly temporary foreign workforce regulated through pass tiers, quotas, and levies (see <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.demographics-society.immigration-and-foreign-workforce">immigration and foreign workforce</a>). This is the country's most contested domestic issue. The government's position is that immigration is a demographic necessity, calibrated to avoid overwhelming infrastructure and social cohesion, and that citizens receive clear priority in housing, education, and healthcare subsidies. Public concern focuses on competition for jobs and university places, crowding on transport and in housing, wage pressure at the lower end, and cultural change — sentiments that surfaced forcefully after the 2013 Population White Paper projected a possible 6.9 million population by 2030 and prompted rare street protests. Subsequent policy has tightened pass criteria repeatedly while keeping the overall model intact.</p>

简介

人口与族群

新加坡总人口为 6.11 million,截至 June 2025,由 3.66 million 公民、0.54 million 永久居民和 1.91 million 非居民组成(《2025 年人口简报》,于 Aug 2026 查阅)。这三类划分是理解新加坡人口状况最重要的事实:境内近三分之一人口既非公民也非 PR,而是外籍劳工、家庭帮佣、学生和受抚养人;他们的居留受准证政策而非定居意义上的移民政策监管(参见工作准证)。另一个结构性事实是出生率持续下降、公民人口迅速老龄化;两者共同使移民政策成为新加坡人口问题中最核心、政治敏感度最高的杠杆。当前主要数据见关键统计数据。

居民、非居民及其统计方式

新加坡统计数据仔细区分三类人口;混淆这些类别是公共讨论中大多数困惑的来源。公民拥有新加坡国籍。永久居民拥有长期居留身份,可无限期居住和工作,但没有投票权;男性 PR 及其儿子须履行国民服役。公民和 PR 合称居民人口,是收入、住房和教育等大多数社会统计数据的基础。非居民是其他所有持准证在新加坡居留的人:各级别工作准证持有者、外籍家庭帮佣、学生及受抚养人。截至 June 2025,非居民人口同比增长 2.7% 至 1.91 million,公民人口增长 0.7%,PR 人口则基本持平——多年来,PR 接收人数一直被有意维持在稳定的年度配额附近(《2025 年人口简报》,于 Aug 2026 查阅)。非居民中约有三分之二属于外籍劳动力,其余三分之一主要是家庭帮佣、受抚养人和学生。

CMIO 框架

新加坡官方将人口分为四个种族类别——华族、马来族、印度族及其他——简称 CMIO。该分类记录在身份证件上,并影响实际政策:根据种族融合政策,组屋区块设有族群配额(见组屋制度概览);集选区设有少数族群代表要求(见集选区);学校按族群分配母语(参见语言与双语政策);并设有按社区组织的自助团体。2025 年公民人口中,75.5% 为华族、15.1% 为马来族、7.6% 为印度族,1.8% 为欧亚裔及其他族群(《2025 年人口简报》,于 Aug 2026 查阅);由于 PR 族群构成不同,较广义居民人口的比例略有差异。支持者认为 CMIO 能确保少数族群在制度中拥有席位,并防止在族群多数明显的社会中出现多数族群主导的倾向。批评者则认为它抹平了庞大的内部多样性——“印度族”涵盖泰米尔人、马拉雅拉姆人、旁遮普人及许多其他社群;“其他”则把欧亚裔与所有无法归入其他类别的人合并——并使种族固化为行政类别,不过自 2010 年起可以登记双重种族,这在一定程度上缓和了这一问题。

生育率骤降与人口老龄化

新加坡的生育率位居全球最低之列,而且仍在下降。居民总和生育率首次跌破 1.0 的时间是 2023 年,当时降至 0.97,2024 年维持在该水平,2025 年进一步跌至约 0.87 的历史新低,远低于 2.1 的人口更替水平,即使与东亚同类经济体相比也偏低。人口老龄化相应地快速发展:截至 2025 年,65 岁及以上人口约占总人口的 19%;80 岁及以上公民人数增长约 60%,从 2015 年的 91,000 人增至 2025 年的 145,000 人(《2025 年人口简报》,于 Aug 2026 查阅)。其原因是高收入社会常见的一系列因素——晚婚、住房及养育子女成本高、工时长,以及女性教育程度提升和职业参与增加。政府先后推出育儿奖金、税务减免、育儿假和住房优先安排等鼓励生育措施,但未能扭转趋势。这些后果影响知识库中的多项政策:医疗保健和长期护理融资(参见医疗保健融资)、退休保障(参见公积金终身入息计划)、劳动年龄人口基础萎缩,以及由此产生的移民依赖。

移民作为平衡杠杆

国家人口与人才署称,移民有助缓和人口老龄化和出生率偏低的影响,同时维持适度步伐,并谨慎管控 PR 和公民身份的批准;2024 年有 35,264 人获批成为 PR,22,766 人获批成为公民(《2025 年人口简报》,于 Aug 2026 查阅)。

由于人口自然增长无法维持劳动力规模,新加坡通过受管制的移民来维持人口规模和经济能力:每年稳定接收新公民和 PR,同时引进规模大得多、明确属临时性质的外籍劳动力,并通过准证等级、配额和征费进行管理(参见移民与外籍劳动力)。这是新加坡国内最具争议的议题。政府认为移民是人口结构上的必要措施,接收规模经过校准,以免基础设施和社会凝聚力承受过大压力,并且公民在住房、教育和医疗保健补贴方面享有明确优先权。公众关注的焦点包括就业和大学学额竞争、交通和住房拥挤、低收入群体的工资压力以及文化变化——这些情绪在 2013 年人口白皮书提出人口到 2030 年可能达到 6.9 million 后强烈浮现,并引发罕见的街头抗议。此后,政府多次收紧准证标准,同时维持整体模式不变。