Singapore–United States Relations

<h1>Singapore–United States Relations</h1> Singapore's relationship with the United States is among the deepest and most institutionally dense in its foreign policy. The United States recognised Singapore's independence on 11 August 1965; formal diplomatic relations and the American embassy opened on 4 April 1966 (<a href="https://history.state.gov/countries/singapore">US State Department, accessed Aug 2026</a>). Leaders marked the 50th anniversary of ties in 2016. Today the partnership spans defence access agreements, the US–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA) — Washington's first FTA with an Asia-Pacific country and, as of 2024–2025, still its only FTA with an <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.foreign-relations.asean">ASEAN</a> member — dense investment flows in both directions, and expanding cooperation in cybersecurity, critical technologies, civil nuclear energy, and space. Singapore is not a US treaty ally, but it hosts United States naval and air logistics at Singapore facilities, buys advanced American military equipment, and maintains one of the largest permanent foreign military training presences on US soil — all within a wider <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.foreign-relations.foreign-policy-doctrine">foreign policy doctrine</a> of refusing to choose between Washington and Beijing. Milestone tables for recognition, MOUs, and USSFTA dates sit in <a href="/en/knowledge/dataset/sgkb.data.us-relations-anchors">us relations anchors</a>. <h2>Historical foundations and strategic partnership</h2> Singapore–United States relations predate independence. American merchants used Singapore as a transshipment port from the 1830s, and the United States established a consulate in 1836 (<a href="https://history.state.gov/countries/singapore">US State Department, accessed Aug 2026</a>). After separation from Malaysia in 1965, the new republic sought security and economic partners quickly; Washington's recognition within days of independence signalled early alignment on sovereignty and market openness, even as Singapore maintained formal non-alignment. The relationship deepened through the Vietnam War era — when Singapore provided logistical support to US forces — and accelerated after the British military withdrawal from Singapore in the 1970s left a security vacuum the United States partly filled through access arrangements rather than permanent bases. Institutional diplomacy now runs through multiple standing forums. The United States–Singapore Strategic Partnership Dialogue, co-chaired at permanent-secretary and assistant-secretary level, reviews political and economic cooperation; the 6th meeting in February 2024 welcomed the USSFTA's 20th anniversary and took stock of the Partnership for Growth and Innovation (PGI) launched in October 2021 (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/joint-statement-on-the-6th-united-states-28-feb-2024/">MFA, Feb 2024</a>). Singapore also hosts the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, which convenes defence ministers and military chiefs from across the Asia-Pacific and has become a flagship venue for US regional engagement. High-profile US visits underscore the relationship's political weight: the US President attended the US–DPRK summit in Singapore in June 2018; the Prime Minister and the US President signed the Protocol of Amendment renewing the defence facilities MOU in September 2019 (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/about-mfa/foreign-policy/countries-and-regions/united-states/">MFA, accessed Aug 2026</a>; see <a href="/en/knowledge/dataset/sgkb.data.officeholders">officeholders</a>). The Foreign Minister has described the partnership as nurtured across both Democratic and Republican administrations over 60 years, with fundamentals that outlast individual leaders (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/20250204-pq-sg-us-relations-04-feb-2025/">MFA, Feb 2025</a>). <h2>Defence cooperation and US regional presence</h2> The defence relationship is the partnership's most visible pillar — and the one most often cited when observers describe Singapore as an undeclared US security partner, even though Singapore is not a treaty ally like Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines. The 1990 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding United States Use of Facilities in Singapore, signed by the founding Prime Minister and the then US Vice President, allows US forces access to Singapore's air and naval bases and provides logistics support for transiting personnel, aircraft, and vessels (<a href="https://www.mindef.gov.sg/news-and-events/latest-releases/24sep19_nr/">MINDEF, Sep 2019</a>). Under its ambit, the United States has rotationally deployed fighter aircraft for exercises, refuelling, and maintenance; Littoral Combat Ships since 2013; and P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft since 2015 (<a href="https://www.mindef.gov.sg/news-and-events/latest-releases/24sep19_fs/">MINDEF, Sep 2019</a>). Singapore frames this access as support for a US strategic presence that remains vital to regional peace and stability (<a href="https://www.mindef.gov.sg/news-and-events/latest-releases/24sep19_nr/">MINDEF, Sep 2019</a>). The 2019 Protocol of Amendment, signed by the Prime Minister and the US President, extended the 1990 MOU for another 15 years (<a href="https://www.mindef.gov.sg/news-and-events/latest-releases/24sep19_fs/">MINDEF, Sep 2019</a>). Above the facilities MOU sits a layered agreement architecture. The 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defence and Security uniquely recognised Singapore as a Major Security Cooperation Partner of the United States (<a href="https://www.mindef.gov.sg/news-and-events/latest-releases/24sep19_fs/">MINDEF, Sep 2019</a>). The 2005 Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) consolidated military-to-military, policy, and technology cooperation; the 2015 Enhanced DCA added humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, cyber defence, biosecurity, and strategic communications (<a href="https://www.mindef.gov.sg/news-and-events/latest-releases/24sep19_fs/">MINDEF, Sep 2019</a>). The Strategic Security Policy Dialogue (SSPD), established under the 2005 agreements, sets the bilateral defence agenda; at the 13th SSPD in September 2023, both sides discussed US support for SAF overseas training and technology access — including the Republic of Singapore Air Force's F-35 acquisition — alongside cybersecurity and critical technologies (<a href="https://www.mindef.gov.sg/news-and-events/latest-releases/18sep23_nr/">MINDEF, Sep 2023</a>). In May 2024, MINDEF and the US Department of Defense signed a Defence Innovation Cooperation MOU at the Shangri-La Dialogue, prioritising maritime security and counter-uncrewed aircraft systems (<a href="https://www.mindef.gov.sg/news-and-events/latest-releases/31may24_fs2/">MINDEF, May 2024</a>). Cooperation runs in both directions. The Singapore Armed Forces maintains three permanent training detachments in Idaho, Arizona, and Texas — comprising the second-largest permanent foreign military contingent stationed in the United States (<a href="https://washington.mfa.gov.sg/about-singapore-us-relations/">Singapore Embassy Washington, accessed Aug 2026</a>). RSAF personnel train at Luke Air Force Base under Peace Carvin II and participate in exercises such as Red Flag alongside US counterparts; senior Singapore leaders have used detachment visits to underline the depth of training ties (<a href="https://www.mindef.gov.sg/news-and-events/latest-releases/07oct23_nr/">MINDEF, Oct 2023</a>). Singapore buys the bulk of its advanced platforms from US suppliers — F-15 and F-16 fighters, Apache helicopters, and F-35 jets — giving Washington leverage over technology transfer that Singapore accepts in exchange for interoperability. Singapore officials consistently argue that US regional engagement underpins the security and economic order from which Southeast Asia benefits, while insisting Singapore never outsources its own defence. <h2>Trade, investment, and the USSFTA</h2> The economic relationship matches the defence partnership in depth. The US–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA) entered into force on 1 January 2004 after 11 rounds of negotiations; the then Prime Minister and the then US President signed the agreement in 2003 (<a href="https://www.mti.gov.sg/newsroom/speech-by-minister-gan-kim-yong-at-the-us-singapore-free-trade-agreement-20th-anniversary-business-reception-at-washington-dc/">MTI, 2024</a>; <a href="https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/grow-your-business/go-global/international-agreements/free-trade-agreements/find-an-fta/ussfta">Enterprise Singapore, accessed Aug 2026</a>). It was the United States' first FTA with an Asia-Pacific country and, as of 2024–2025, remains its only FTA with an ASEAN member (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/20250204-pq-sg-us-relations-04-feb-2025/">MFA, Feb 2025</a>). The USSFTA eliminates tariffs on Singapore's exports to the United States, waives US merchandise processing fees on qualifying Singapore-origin goods, liberalises services market access, and protects cross-border investment; exporters self-certify origin and US importers claim preferential treatment — the same model described in <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.economy-finance.trade-and-fta-network">trade and fta network</a> (<a href="https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/grow-your-business/go-global/international-agreements/free-trade-agreements/find-an-fta/ussfta">Enterprise Singapore, accessed Aug 2026</a>). Bilateral merchandise trade has almost tripled since 2004 (<a href="https://www.mti.gov.sg/newsroom/speech-by-minister-gan-kim-yong-at-the-us-singapore-free-trade-agreement-20th-anniversary-business-reception-at-washington-dc/">MTI, 2024</a>). As of 2024–2025, the United States is Singapore's largest foreign direct investor by country, its top trading partner in services, and its second-largest trading partner in goods (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/20250204-pq-sg-us-relations-04-feb-2025/">MFA, Feb 2025</a>; <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/about-mfa/foreign-policy/countries-and-regions/united-states/">MFA, accessed Aug 2026</a>). Cumulative US FDI stock in Singapore exceeds US investment in China, India, Japan, and South Korea combined (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/20250204-pq-sg-us-relations-04-feb-2025/">MFA, Feb 2025</a>). The Singapore Embassy in Washington reports more than 6,600 US companies based in Singapore; bilateral trade and Singapore's investments across more than 45 US states support around 350,000 American jobs (<a href="https://washington.mfa.gov.sg/about-singapore-us-relations/">Singapore Embassy Washington, accessed Aug 2026</a>; page last updated 16 Apr 2026). Singapore is the third-largest Asian investor in the United States, with some 200 Singapore companies operating across dozens of states (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/20250204-pq-sg-us-relations-04-feb-2025/">MFA, Feb 2025</a>). The United States consistently runs a trade surplus with Singapore — a fact Singapore cites when arguing it is unlikely to face direct US tariff action despite global trade tensions (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/20250204-pq-sg-us-relations-04-feb-2025/">MFA, Feb 2025</a>). Beyond the USSFTA, the Partnership for Growth and Innovation (PGI), launched in 2021 by the Minister for Trade and Industry and the US Commerce Secretary, targets collaboration in the digital economy, advanced manufacturing and supply chains, clean energy, and healthcare (<a href="https://washington.mfa.gov.sg/about-singapore-us-relations/">Singapore Embassy Washington, accessed Aug 2026</a>). Singapore participates in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), including the Supply Chain Agreement that entered into force in February 2024 (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/joint-statement-on-the-6th-united-states-28-feb-2024/">MFA, Feb 2024</a>). People-to-people links include the US–Singapore Summer Exchange Scholarship (50 students each way over five years from 2016), mutual trusted-traveller programmes (Global Entry for Singapore citizens; Enhanced Immigration Automated Clearance for US citizens), and the Third Country Training Programme jointly offering capacity building to ASEAN and, since 2023, Pacific Islands Forum members (<a href="https://washington.mfa.gov.sg/about-singapore-us-relations/">Singapore Embassy Washington, accessed Aug 2026</a>). <h2>Balancing Washington and Beijing</h2> Singapore's United States relationship sits inside the same omni-directional strategy that governs its <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.foreign-relations.china-relations">China ties</a> — the central tension in its <a href="/en/knowledge/article/sgkb.foreign-relations.foreign-policy-doctrine">foreign policy doctrine</a>. Singapore hosts US naval logistics and buys American weapons while running government-to-government industrial projects in China and maintaining dense trade and investment links with Beijing. Leaders describe the posture as "pro-Singapore" rather than pro-America or pro-China: useful to both powers without being "made use of" by either. The Foreign Minister has said Singapore delivers the same message to Washington and Beijing, will remain open to enterprises from both countries, and must engage all emerging poles of power — the US, China, India, the EU, and beyond — at a time when the post-1945 liberal order is eroding (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/20250204-pq-sg-us-relations-04-feb-2025/">MFA, Feb 2025</a>). US–China strategic mistrust, technology export controls, and tariff disputes have made this balancing act materially harder since the late 2010s. Singapore's leadership argues that full economic decoupling would damage both superpowers and the wider region, and that dense trade agreements — including the USSFTA, CPTPP, and RCEP — offer partial insulation. But the Foreign Minister has also warned that as a small open economy whose trade exceeds three times GDP, Singapore will be hit indirectly even if it avoids direct US tariffs, because any degradation of global supply chains affects re-exports and regional demand (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/20250204-pq-sg-us-relations-04-feb-2025/">MFA, Feb 2025</a>). Critics abroad sometimes portray Singapore as a US security proxy; critics at home occasionally worry the facilities MOU exposes Singapore to great-power pressure. Singapore's consistent answer is that US regional presence has underwritten Asia-Pacific stability for decades, that ASEAN elevated ties with Washington to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2022, and that hosting US forces is a sovereign choice distinct from alliance — compatible with deep economic engagement with China. The US relationship is therefore not a rival track to China ties but one compartment of a single strategy of maximising options in an increasingly bifurcated world. <h2>Frontier cooperation: cyber, technology, space, and nuclear energy</h2> Singapore–United States cooperation has expanded beyond traditional defence and trade into frontier domains that both governments treat as strategic. Cybersecurity cooperation includes the inaugural US–Singapore Cyber Dialogue in 2022 and a declaration of intent signed in 2018 for a Singapore–US Cybersecurity Technical Assistance Programme (<a href="https://washington.mfa.gov.sg/about-singapore-us-relations/">Singapore Embassy Washington, accessed Aug 2026</a>; <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/about-mfa/foreign-policy/countries-and-regions/united-states/">MFA, accessed Aug 2026</a>). The US–Singapore Dialogue on Critical and Emerging Technology, launched in 2023, covers artificial intelligence, digital economy and data governance, biotechnology, critical infrastructure, defence innovation, and quantum information science (<a href="https://washington.mfa.gov.sg/about-singapore-us-relations/">Singapore Embassy Washington, accessed Aug 2026</a>). Space cooperation followed Singapore's signing of the Artemis Accords in 2022 and the first bilateral Space Dialogue in 2023 (<a href="https://washington.mfa.gov.sg/about-singapore-us-relations/">Singapore Embassy Washington, accessed Aug 2026</a>). Climate cooperation runs through the US–Singapore Climate Partnership, first launched in 2021 and updated in 2023 to intensify work on regional energy transition, low-emission technologies, nature-based solutions, urban decarbonisation, and capacity building (<a href="https://washington.mfa.gov.sg/about-singapore-us-relations/">Singapore Embassy Washington, accessed Aug 2026</a>). On civil nuclear energy, the two governments signed a 123 Agreement on 31 July 2024 — the standard US framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation — which entered into force in December 2024, alongside a memorandum on strategic civil nuclear cooperation signed in January 2025 (<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/20240731--123a-joint-agreement-31-jul-2024/">MFA, Jul 2024</a>; <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.sg/newsroom/press-statements-transcripts-and-photos/20250204-pq-sg-us-relations-04-feb-2025/">MFA, Feb 2025</a>). The agreements enable Singapore to evaluate advanced nuclear technologies, including small modular reactors, against climate goals while meeting non-proliferation standards — Singapore has not committed to building nuclear plants, but officials treat civil nuclear cooperation as part of the long-term low-carbon options mix. These frontier programmes illustrate how the US partnership functions as a living platform: anchored by the 1990 facilities MOU and the USSFTA, but continuously extended into domains that did not exist when diplomatic relations opened in 1966.

索引

简介

新加坡—美国关系

新加坡与美国的关系是新加坡外交政策中最深厚、制度联系最密集的关系之一。美国于 11 八月 1965 承认新加坡独立；正式外交关系及美国大使馆于 4 四月 1966 开始运作（美国国务院，资料查阅于 2026 年八月）。两国领导人在 2016 年纪念关系建立 50 周年。如今，伙伴关系涵盖防务准入协议、《美新自由贸易协定（USSFTA）》——这是华盛顿与亚太国家签订的首个自贸协定，且截至 2024—2025 年仍是其与东盟成员国签订的唯一自贸协定——双向密集投资，以及不断扩大的网络安全、关键技术、民用核能和太空合作。新加坡不是美国条约盟友，但允许美国海军和空军在新加坡设施开展后勤活动，采购先进的美国军事装备，并在美国本土维持规模最大的常驻外国军事训练力量之一；这一切都遵循其更广泛的外交政策原则，即拒绝在华盛顿和北京之间选边站。有关承认、谅解备忘录及 USSFTA 日期的里程碑表见美新关系关键节点。

历史基础与战略伙伴关系

新加坡与美国的关系早于新加坡独立。自十九世纪三十年代起，美国商人便将新加坡用作转口港；美国于 1836 年设立领事馆（美国国务院，资料查阅于 2026 年八月）。1965 年与马来西亚分离后，新共和国迅速寻求安全和经济伙伴；华盛顿在独立后数日内予以承认，体现了双方在主权和开放市场方面的早期共识，同时新加坡仍坚持正式的不结盟立场。在越战时期，双方关系日益深化——当时新加坡为美军提供后勤支援——并在英国于七十年代撤出新加坡后加速发展。英国撤军留下安全真空，美国通过准入安排而非设立永久基地，部分填补了这一真空。

如今，制度化外交通过多个常设论坛开展。由常任秘书和助理国务卿级官员共同主持的美新战略伙伴关系对话审视政治和经济合作；2024 年二月举行的第六次会议庆祝 USSFTA 签署二十周年，并回顾 2021 年十月启动的增长与创新伙伴关系（PGI）进展（外交部，2024 年二月）。新加坡还主办一年一度的香格里拉对话会，邀请亚太各地的国防部长和军方首长出席，已成为美国开展区域交往的重要平台。高层访问彰显这段关系的政治分量：美国总统于 2018 年六月在新加坡出席美朝峰会；新加坡总理与美国总统于 2019 年九月签署议定书，修订并续延防务设施谅解备忘录（外交部，资料查阅于 2026 年八月；另见在任官员）。外交部长曾表示，这段伙伴关系在民主党和共和党政府执政期间均得到培育，历经 60 年，其根基不会因个别领导人而改变（外交部，2025 年二月）。

防务合作与美国的区域存在

防务关系是这段伙伴关系中最醒目的支柱，也是观察人士常用来形容新加坡为美国非正式安全伙伴的依据，尽管新加坡并非像日本、韩国或菲律宾那样的条约盟友。1990 年《美国使用新加坡设施谅解备忘录》由新加坡开国总理和时任美国副总统签署，允许美军使用新加坡空军和海军基地，并为过境人员、飞机和船只提供后勤支持（国防部，2019 年九月）。根据该备忘录，美国轮流部署战斗机进行演习、空中加油和维护；自 2013 年起部署濒海战斗舰；自 2015 年起部署 P-8 波塞冬海上巡逻机（国防部，2019 年九月）。新加坡将这类准入安排视为对美国战略存在的支持，并认为这种存在对区域和平与稳定仍至关重要（国防部，2019 年九月）。由总理和美国总统签署的 2019 年修订议定书将 1990 年谅解备忘录延长 15 年（国防部，2019 年九月）。

在设施谅解备忘录之上，还有多层协议架构。2005 年《加强防务与安全合作战略框架协议》特别承认新加坡是美国的主要安全合作伙伴（国防部，2019 年九月）。2005 年《防务合作协议》（DCA）整合了军事交流、政策和技术合作；2015 年强化版 DCA则纳入人道援助与救灾、网络防务、生物安全和战略沟通（国防部，2019 年九月）。根据 2005 年协议设立的战略安全政策对话（SSPD）负责制定双边防务议程；在 2023 年九月举行的第十三次 SSPD 上，双方讨论了美国支持新加坡武装部队海外训练和技术准入的事宜，包括新加坡空军购买 F-35 战机，以及网络安全和关键技术（国防部，2023 年九月）。2024 年五月，国防部与美国国防部在香格里拉对话会期间签署防务创新合作谅解备忘录，将海上安全和反无人机系统列为优先合作领域（国防部，2024 年五月）。

合作是双向的。新加坡武装部队在爱达荷州、亚利桑那州和得克萨斯州设有三处常驻训练分队，是驻扎在美国的外国军事人员中规模第二大的常驻队伍（新加坡驻华盛顿大使馆，资料查阅于 2026 年八月）。新加坡空军人员在卢克空军基地参加 Peace Carvin II 训练，并与美方人员参加 Red Flag 等演习；新加坡高级领导人访问训练分队时，也借此强调双方训练联系深厚（国防部，2023 年十月）。新加坡从美国供应商采购大部分先进军事装备，包括 F-15 和 F-16 战机、阿帕奇直升机及 F-35 战机；作为交换，新加坡接受华盛顿对技术转让的影响力，以实现互操作性。新加坡官员一贯主张，美国参与区域事务支撑了东南亚受益于其中的安全和经济秩序，同时强调新加坡绝不会把自身防务外包。

贸易、投资与 USSFTA

经贸关系的深度不亚于防务伙伴关系。《美新自由贸易协定》（USSFTA）经过 11 轮谈判后，于 2004 年一月 1 日生效；时任新加坡总理和美国总统于 2003 年签署协定（贸工部，2024 年；新加坡企业发展局，资料查阅于 2026 年八月）。这是美国与亚太国家签订的首个自贸协定；截至 2024—2025 年，仍是美国与东盟成员国签订的唯一自贸协定（外交部，2025 年二月）。USSFTA 取消新加坡输美产品关税，豁免符合条件的新加坡原产商品的美国商品加工费，开放服务市场准入，并保护跨境投资；出口商自行认证原产地，美国进口商则申请优惠待遇——这与贸易与自贸协定网络所述模式相同（新加坡企业发展局，资料查阅于 2026 年八月）。

自 2004 年以来，双边货物贸易额几乎增长至三倍（贸工部，2024 年）。截至 2024—2025 年，美国按来源国计算是新加坡最大的外国直接投资者、新加坡最重要的服务贸易伙伴，也是新加坡第二大货物贸易伙伴（外交部，2025 年二月；外交部，资料查阅于 2026 年八月）。美国在新加坡的累计直接投资存量超过其在中国、印度、日本和韩国的投资总和（外交部，2025 年二月）。新加坡驻华盛顿大使馆报告称，超过 6,600 家美国公司在新加坡设立机构；双边贸易及新加坡在美国超过 45 个州的投资，支撑约 350,000 个美国就业岗位（新加坡驻华盛顿大使馆，资料查阅于 2026 年八月；网页最后更新于 2026 年四月 16 日）。新加坡是美国的第三大亚洲投资者，约有 200 家新加坡公司在美国数十个州经营（外交部，2025 年二月）。美国对新加坡长期保持贸易顺差；新加坡据此指出，尽管全球贸易紧张局势持续，自己不太可能受到美国直接加征关税（外交部，2025 年二月）。

除 USSFTA 外，增长与创新伙伴关系（PGI）由新加坡贸工部长和美国商务部长于 2021 年启动，旨在推动数字经济、先进制造业和供应链、清洁能源及医疗卫生领域的合作（新加坡驻华盛顿大使馆，资料查阅于 2026 年八月）。新加坡参与印太经济繁荣框架（IPEF），包括于 2024 年二月生效的供应链协定（外交部，2024 年二月）。民间交流包括美新暑期交流奖学金（从 2016 年起，五年内双方各派五十名学生）、互认的可信旅客计划（新加坡公民可使用 Global Entry；美国公民可使用加强版移民自动通关），以及共同为东盟成员国提供能力建设的第三国培训计划；自 2023 年起，该计划也涵盖太平洋岛国论坛成员（新加坡驻华盛顿大使馆，资料查阅于 2026 年八月）。

在华盛顿与北京之间保持平衡

新加坡与美国的关系处于同一套全方位战略之中，这套战略也指导其对华关系，并构成其外交政策原则的核心张力。新加坡为美国海军提供后勤支持并购买美国武器，同时在中国开展政府间产业项目，并与北京保持密切的贸易和投资联系。领导人将这种立场称为**“亲新加坡”，而非亲美或亲中：与两个大国互利，同时不被任何一方“利用”。外交部长表示，新加坡向华盛顿和北京传达同样的信息**，将继续向两国企业开放，并必须与美国、中国、印度、欧盟及其他所有新兴力量中心接触；此时，1945 年后的自由主义秩序正不断衰退（外交部，2025 年二月）。

自二〇一〇年代后期以来，美中战略互不信任、技术出口管制和关税争端，使这种平衡变得艰难许多。新加坡领导层认为，全面经济脱钩会损害两个超级大国及整个地区，而包括 USSFTA、CPTPP 和 RCEP 在内的密集贸易协定可以提供部分缓冲。但外交部长也曾警告，作为贸易额超过国内生产总值三倍的小型开放经济体，即使新加坡避开美国直接关税，也会受到间接冲击，因为全球供应链任何恶化都会影响再出口和区域需求（外交部，2025 年二月）。海外批评者有时将新加坡描绘成美国的安全代理人；国内批评者偶尔担心设施谅解备忘录会使新加坡暴露于大国压力之下。新加坡一贯回应称，美国在区域的存在数十年来支撑了亚太稳定；东盟于 2022 年将与华盛顿的关系提升为全面战略伙伴关系；驻有美军是新加坡自主作出的选择，性质不同于结盟，而且与对华深度经贸往来并不冲突。因此，美新关系并非与对华关系相互竞争的另一条路线，而是在世界日益两极分化之际，最大限度保留选择空间这一整体战略中的一个部分。

前沿合作：网络安全、技术、太空与核能

新加坡与美国的合作已从传统防务和贸易扩展到两国政府都视为战略领域的前沿领域。网络安全合作包括 2022 年首次举行的美新网络对话，以及双方于 2018 年签署的建立新加坡—美国网络安全技术援助计划意向声明（新加坡驻华盛顿大使馆，资料查阅于 2026 年八月；外交部，资料查阅于 2026 年八月）。美新关键和新兴技术对话于 2023 年启动，涵盖人工智能、数字经济和数据治理、生物技术、关键基础设施、防务创新及量子信息科学（新加坡驻华盛顿大使馆，资料查阅于 2026 年八月）。新加坡签署**《阿耳忒弥斯协定》后，双方于 2022 年开展太空合作，并于 2023 年举行首次双边太空对话**（新加坡驻华盛顿大使馆，资料查阅于 2026 年八月）。

气候合作通过美新气候伙伴关系开展，该伙伴关系最初于 2021 年启动，并于 2023 年更新，以加强区域能源转型、低排放技术、基于自然的解决方案、城市脱碳和能力建设方面的工作（新加坡驻华盛顿大使馆，资料查阅于 2026 年八月）。在民用核能方面，两国政府于 2024 年七月 31 日签署**《123 协定》**——这是美国和平利用核能合作的标准框架——协定于 2024 年十二月生效；双方还于 2025 年一月签署关于民用核能战略合作的谅解备忘录（外交部，2024 年七月；外交部，2025 年二月）。这些协议使新加坡能够依据气候目标评估包括小型模块化反应堆在内的先进核技术，同时遵守防扩散标准；新加坡尚未承诺建设核电厂，但官员将民用核能合作视为长期低碳选项组合的一部分。这些前沿计划说明，美新伙伴关系是一个持续发展的平台：以 1990 年设施谅解备忘录和 USSFTA 为基础，并不断延伸至 1966 年两国建立外交关系时尚不存在的领域。

讨论

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